I will call the Warner-Nagel thesis is the claim that, even with a true and exhaustive scientific description of the world, we will have failed to capture a fundamental and important aspect of it: the qualitative character of experience.
1
Since understanding what it is like to be an X, requires facts which are accessible from only one point of view, X's, the methodology of science is simply unsuited for the sort of understanding required to capture the qualitative character of a thing's experiences. Hence reductionist programs were ill conceived from the very beginning:
there is something about consciousness that cannot be captured in scientific accounts of the mind.
Warner's argument does not have this ring of finality about it. He concedes, for instance, that "some as yet unformulated form of physicalism might be true" and concentrates his argument on current electrochemical theories of the brain (and thus remains silent as to the inherent limitations of objective science).
Warner admits, however, that in so doing he concedes little. His thesis is clearly that science, as far as we are capable of conceiving it, cannot capture the qualitative character of experience; and thus property dualism is the correct philosophical analysis of mental states.
In what follows I will concentrate upon Warner's paper "In Defence of a Dualism" and mention Nagel's arguments only as they bear upon the issues considered. Since, as of this writing, Richard Warner's paper remains unpublished, (though widely circulated and read), no familiarity with the paper will be assumed on the part of the reader.
In rough outline. Section 1 of this paper details Warner's argument for the WarnerNagel thesis. Section 2 briefly discusses the logical relation between Warner's argument and Nagel's wellknown argument in "What is it Like to be a Bat."* Section 3 contains direct criticisms of Warner's argument.
Section 4 outlines what I take to be wrong with any account of property dualism, and section 5 suggests relations between the Warner-Nagel thesis and private language. Reference is here made to Kripke's Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language. I I should begin by saying that, for the most part, I agree with the Warner-Nagel thesis. I do not believe that phyBicalist or functionalist theories of the mind capture the qualitative character of our experiences; nor do I think they can. I do not believe, however, that Warner's argument establishes this claim.
And, most importantly, I do not believe this limitation on physicalism implies that we should accept either property or substance dualism.
I will, of course, say a good deal about this later, but the thought behind this assertion is the following. To understand what it is like to be an X requires that one instantiate a certain physical or functional state. But this state is not the state which it is like to be in when one, e.g., reads about an X or studies an X. Warner and Nagel understand this distinction when they tell us that
reading about pain (or bats) fails to help us understand what it is like to be in pain (or be a bat).
It is natural to say at this point that of course the two are different, and why should this discrepancy constitute a lack of knowledge? After all, we may study black holes or electrons without being black holes or electrons.
As natural as this rejoinder may be, it misses the point of Warner's and Nagel's argument. Their point is that it is not like anything to be a black hole or electron, whereas it is like something to be in pain or a bat. Therefore our scientific accounts of the world would fail to capture an important aspect of the world in the case of consciousness, which they would not fail to capture in the case of inanimate objects.
With a true and complete theory of black holes, for instance, there would be nothing left to know about black holes. The same is not true of pain; with a true and complete theory of pain there would be something left to know about pain: how it feels.
Having conceded this point to Warner and Nagel, however, I do not think we are logically forced to concede that the only analysis of mind is property dualism. One of the arguments presented later in the paper will be a refined version of the unsatisfactory rejoinder mentioned above. What Warner means by nonevidential is (1) there are cases where a person feels pain, or is in pain, and (2) no evidence other than the pain itself needs to be considered for a person to know that he is in pain. Evidence for being in pain would be appropriate if it were possible that one should seem to be in pain when one is in fact not. Here Warner assumes that "pain has a certain 'qualitative character'-a certain felt qualitywhich manifests itself to one who feels pain. This qualitative character is such that if it seems to be present, it is present; and if it is present, one is in pain." His argument is this. We suppose that a painless (and curious) Alpha Centaurian temporarily modifies his central nervous system in order to induce S (a mild, but painful stomach cramp) in himself.
"The experimenter gives the nod to his assistant to flip the switch and immediately after that he simultaneously experiences nausea and a mild, but painful stomach cramp. The nausea was an unforeseen consequence of the alterations in his nervous system."' If the identity theory is true, the Alpha Centaurian must know, nonevidentially, which of the two is pain. He has a complete and true description of pain, even the way pain feels, so how can he fail to know which of the two feelings is pain? To say that he must know nonevidentially which of the two is pain Bimply means that he cannot check his instruments, or any other evidence other than the qualitative way in which each sensation feels, in deciding which of the two is pain.
The truth of the counterfactual, then, rests upon three assumptions.
(A) T states everything there is to state about pain.
(B) The qualitative character of pain manifests itself nonevidentially. And (C), from T the Alpha Centaurian acquires the recognitional abilities necessary for correctly identifying the qualitative character of pain. Thus, if the identity theory is true, premise (1) is true.
I will return to these assumptions shortly. But first, how is premise (2) established? Warner doesn't argue for (2) directly; rather, he argues for the falsity of the consequent of (1). Of course this would directly establish that pain is not an electrochemical state, but Warner thinks that (2) "is important; it is," he suggests, "the best explanation of why the consequent of (1) is false."* (The logical inference in the argument is modus tollens.)
Warner's argument for the falsity of the consequent of (1) is simple and direct. Pain manifests itself as having a certain qualitative character which the Alpha Centaurian will be ignorant of until he has the appropriate sort of experience. But he cannot know nonevidentially which of the two experiences (pain or nausea) is the one which he set out to induce in himself until he checks his instruments. He cannot know nonevidentially that the relevant electrochemical activity is occurring. The electrochemical description of pain which he has read and understood is the only thing about pain that could possibly play a role in his nonevidentially Suppose a person who has never seen, say, a pomegranate possesses a true and complete description of pomegranates-including a description of the way pomegranates appear to a normal perceiver. Suppose we place a pomegranate and a nectarine in front of the person, who as it happens has never seen a nectarine. There is nothing defective in the person'8 perceptual and reasoning faculties: . . . It follows that he must be able to tell which is the pomegranate."
The relevant information will allow him to know which fruit is the pomegranate--but only if he already pos-sesses certain other recognitional abilities:
e.g., the ability to recognize dark red. Given these preexisting abilities, he will be able to distinguish the pomegranate from the nectarine. The disanalogy between this and the Alpha Centaurian case is that the latter, by virtue of his previous painlessness, does not have the preexisting background of recognitional abilities.
Warner'8 reply is that the Alpha Centaurian does not lack the necessary background of recognitional abi 11 ties. We suppose that the Alpha Centaurian has the ability to know nonevidentially that he has a nonpainful cramping feeling. When he reads T he learns that a cramping feeling of such-and-such intensity is a case of pain-where the degree of intensity is truly and completely described.
Even the way such intensity feels is described.
"Now how can we deny that the Alpha Centaurian lacks the relevant recognitional abilities because he has never experienced a cramping feeling of the relevant degree of intensity, . Therefore, the argument goes, physicalism cannot be the whole story. This overlooks a crucial point, however: he is also told what pain feels like. So the claim isn't that from T alone he should be able to distinguish the two sensations if some form of the identity theory is true; rather, the claim is that from T and a description of the way pain feels he should be able to distinguish the two. This is important for the following reason.
If we take facts to be the sorts of things capable of being expressed by propositions, then facts of experience should be capable of being expressed by propositions, and indeed they are. I think the general conclusion we can draw from these criticisms of Warner and Nagel is that there is, Indeed, a difference between being in a state of pain and reading true and complete descriptions of pain. And the latter yields little knowledge of the qualitative nature of pain. But all this indicates is that there is a difference between understanding a description and instantiating a state.
It is a contingent fact about us that we can only instantiate a limited number of states. And we cannot know a priori what it will be like to instantiate those states which it is possible for us to be in. To the extent in which this limits our bodily and perceptual sensations, it also limits our knowledge of those states which it can be said that it is like something to be in. But the states we can instantiate are physical ones. If Warner and Nagel insist that, necessarily, our bodily and perceptual states cannot be physical states, then they will have to base this on something more substantial than the contingent fact that we cannot instantiate the same states as a bat.
IV
I now wish to discuss what I take to be wrong with any account of property dualism.
While few philosophers seriously consider substance or Cartesian dualism to be a solution to the mind-body problem, property dualism still appears to many a legitimate alternative: particularly in light of the implausibility of eliminative materialism and the failure of logical behaviorism. What I shall argue is that property dualism is every bit as conceptually confused as substance dualism; and perhaps even more so since not only do famil-iar substance-property problems arise, but even more confounding physical substance, mental property relations arise, which are, so far as I can see, impossible to make any kind of sense of.
A property dualist will, to some extent, be a realist concerning mental states. "There are" Warner says, "feelings, thoughts, emotions, and so on, and words like 'pain' refer to such states." Accordingly, the property dualist must say that mental state terms pick out,or refer, to nonphysical properties of physical organisms.
There There are two replies the dualist might make to these charges. First, he could say that it is an accident of grammar that subject-predicate terms are used in the way in which they are, viz., to distinguish substance-property relations. When I say "I have a pain" I am not referring to a substance which has the property of being in pain. Nor when I say "I am aware of a pain" do I-the dualist-mean to imply that there are two things going on, pain and an awareness. To have a pain is to be aware that one has a pain. Secondly, the property dualist might insist that mental properties are merely concomitant with physical states or events, like c-fiber stimulation, and that this expresses no more than the overall state of the organism, and furthermore that this is no more mysteriovis than the fact that temperature is a property of a gas which expresses the overall mean kinetic energy of the gas molecules.
The first of these replies is at least defensible, but, I think, clearly leads to a Humean bundle-theory of perception and serious problems with self-identity through time. Otherwise he cannot claim that it is the physical property which does the interacting.
Where there is c-fiber stimulation, there will be pain, and where there is pain, there will be c-fiber stimulation. And it will be the physical state of c-fiber stimulation which causes the pain feeler to act in the way in which he does. Thus the predicates will be extensionally equivalent. Further, the properties they express will be causally indiscernable. The point of saying that the two properties were concomitant was to explain the causal role of the mental property-or better, to explain away the causal role of the mental property.
It cannot be the case that we will have two distinct properties which are constantly conjoined, as in Putnam's example of the temperature and conductivity of a metal. What leads us to say in the case of temperature and conductivity that we have two properties is the fact that they are causally discernible.
Pain, however, unless it is to have a causal role independent of the c-fiber stimulation, will be causally indiscernible from the physical state it is concomitant with. If this convinces us that the two properties are causally indiscernible and that the predicates which express them must be extensionally equivalent, then I can see no reason for not maintaining that the properties are one and the same.
The second problem with this formulation is that most dualist accounts of the mind, at least of the Descartes-Kripke variety, wish to maintain that there is at least a logical possibility that the mind can exist without the body.
If mental properties require concomitant physical properties, however, this possibility is lost.
If pain can exist if and only if c-fiber stimulation exists, then we are faced with saying that there is not even a logically possible world where pain could be associated with another physical process, or no physical process at all. This seems a much too strict logical requirement on any plausible account of dualism:
if mental properties are in fact not physical ones, then the logical possibility of their distinct existence should be maintained. As was noted, this account of property dualism fails in this respect.
These difficulties with the dualist's position could be multiplied, but probably to little avail. My point is that however the dualist finally expresses what he means by saying that my pain is a nonphysical property, he will either encounter the same problems as the substance dualist, or find himself defending a position where nonphysical properties are indiscernible from physical ones. In either case, the conceptual and ontological problems seem intractable. V Finally, I wiBh to place the issues surrounding the Warner-Nagel thesis in larger perspective. Again, for the sake of argument, assume that the Alpha Centaurian, or the congenitally blind individual, did acquire the recognitional abilities needed to correctly identify pain or color. And they did so simply from reading the theory.
What would we be inclined to say about this? I think we would have to say that they were privately following a rule. Consider: the Alpha Centaurian certainly feels something, just as the congenitally blind person certainly sees the colors following the corrective surgery. This much no one disputes. The problem la that neither knows how to correctly formulate and apply the concepts necessary to identify the qualitative character of their respective experiences. And, as Warner formulates the problem, the only evidence which they are allowed is the qualitative character of their experiences; they must know nonevidentially which state they are in. So if they were able to correctly formulate and apply the relevant concepts it would have to be privately: consulting others would violate the nonevidential stipulation. And it does no good to claim, at this point, that they are allowed to consult the theory. Everyone agrees that pain does not manifest itself as an electrochemical phenomenon.
If we observed that they were able to formulate the concepts and correctly apply them, we would be forced to say that they were acting independently of the linguistic community.
(For this reason, when I say "correctly applying the concepts," I do not mean that they must call red by what we call it. Rather, however they formulate and apply their concepts, their present usage must conform to their past intentions: their behavior must be rule governed.)
As Kripke** formulates the Wittgenstein!an sceptical problem which gives rise to the argument against private languages, what we cannot do is point to a fact about our past or present mental states or our external behavior which will guarantee that our present meanings conform to our past intentions. There is nothing in my current or past mental states which determines what I ought to do in the present situation.
There is nothing, for instance, which determines that I should not presently mean grue when I say 'green'. The argument against private languages arises when Wittgenstein attempts to meet these sceptical arguments.
What Wittgenstein in effect does is replace the question "What must be the case for this sentence to be true?" with: (1) Under what conditions may this form of words be appropriately asserted? And (2), given (1), what is the role, utility, in our lives of our practice of asserting this form of words under these conditions? What I believe most philosophers find compelling and true in this argument is the idea that, if considered in isolation, the notion of following a rule has no substantive content. Even if we do not accept the claim that there is nothing in our current mental states which determines our present intentions, I think we must still say that following a rule requires public checks upon the conditions in which the rule applies. If we wish to know what Jones means by 'red', we should not look to mental facts about Jones, but rather to the assertabllity conditions under which he says that something is red. This much should be clear: the argument is not that I cannot 'mean' anything I want by a term, or change it as often as I like. The argument, rather, is that the meaning of a term comes only through how it incorrigibility.
Public criteria must also be considered. Thus there should not be anything troublesome in the fact that science moves away from facts which are accessible from only one point of view and towards facts which are intersubjective and public: there are no facts which are accessible from only one point of view. 
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